


Monitorability under Assumptions

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joint work with Tom Henzinger
RV 2020

Online Black-Box Monitoring



Bounded number of monitor operations
per system operation (“real time” [Rabin63]).

Summary

1. Assumptions in monitoring
2. Register monitors (with Thomas Ferrère and Tom Henzinger)

Two Trends that Favor Runtime Verification

1. Ever increasing hardware parallelism

- many-core processors, computer clusters
- not all hardware resources will go into performance
(some will hopefully go into assurance)

2. Ever increasing software complexity

- machine-learned components, cloud connectivity
- the static “verification gap” will increase
(software complexity grows faster than verification capability)

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Two Observations about Runtime Verification

1. Static verification is about **emptiness**,
runtime verification is about **membership**

- formalisms and methods need to reflect this
- opening for quantitative and approximate methods
(distance measures between **behaviors** rather than **systems**)

2. To increase acceptance and trust of monitors,
unintrusive online third-party approaches are essential

- **unintrusive** means black-box and low overhead
- **online** means real-time and best-effort
- **third-party** means that system and monitor are designed independently

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Response Property

Observations

$$\Sigma = \{a, b, t, o\}$$

Behaviors

$$\Sigma^\omega$$

Response

$$\Box(a \rightarrow \Diamond b)$$

o t t o a t o t t t b t o o t t o t a t o t t o a o t o o t t t o o b o t o t o t o t o t ...

Response is **live** (every finite behavior can be extended to satisfy response).

Response is **co-live** (every finite behavior can be extended to violate response).

Response is **not monitorable** in any sense of the word
(no finite behavior allows a positive or negative verdict).

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Bounded Response Property

Observations	$\Sigma = \{a, b, t, o\}$
Behaviors	Σ^ω
Bounded response	$\Box(a \rightarrow \Diamond_{\leq 5} b)$

o t t o a t o t t t b t o o t t o t a t o t t o a o t o o t t t o o b o t o t o t o t o t ...

Bounded response is **not live** (consider the prefix *a t t t t t t*).

Bounded response is **not safe** (consider the trace *a o o o o o o ...*).

Bounded response is **co-live** (consider the extension *a t t t t t t ...*).

Bounded response is **monitorable**

(for every finite behavior the continuation *a t t t t t t* allows a negative verdict).

Bounded Response Property

Observations	$\Sigma = \{a, b, t, o\}$
Assumption	$\Box \Diamond t$
Bounded response	$\Box(a \rightarrow \Diamond_{\leq 5} b)$

o t t o a t o t t t b t o o t t o t a t o t t o a o t o o t t t o o b o t o t o t o t o t ...

Bounded response is **safe under the assumption** [H92]
(every violating behavior has a finite prefix that allows a negative verdict).

Assumptions make properties “safer” and “more monitorable”.

Assumptions

An assumption $A \subseteq \Sigma^\omega$ restricts the universe of possible behaviors.

How do assumptions arise?

1. Knowledge about the system (predictive monitoring)
2. Knowledge about the environment (e.g. $\Box \Diamond t$)
3. Information from other monitors (decentralized monitoring)
 - $\Box$ decomposition of monitors
 - $\Box$ assume-guarantee monitoring

Monitorability under Assumptions

A finite behavior α allows a positive (negative) verdict for property P under assumption A if all extensions of α in A satisfy (resp. violate) P .

The property P is monitorable under assumption A if for every finite prefix α from A , there is a finite continuation β from A such that $\alpha\beta$ allows a positive or negative verdict for P under A .

Note: monitorability under assumption Σ^ω is Pnueli-Zaks monitorability.

An Assumption for Response

Observations	$\Sigma = \{a, b, o\}$
Assumption A	$\Box(a \wedge \ominus ((\neg b)Sa) \rightarrow \Box \neg b)$
Response R	$\Box(a \rightarrow \Diamond b)$

Response R is **not monitorable**.

Response R is **monitorable under assumption A**

(for every finite behavior the continuation aa allows a negative verdict).

What is Monitorable under Assumptions?

The property P is **safe under assumption** A if for every behavior in $A \setminus P$ has a finite prefix that allows a negative verdict for P under A .

The property P is **co-safe under assumption** A if for every behavior in $A \cap P$ has a finite prefix that allows a positive verdict for P under A .

Let $Obl(A)$ be the **positive boolean combinations of safety and co-safety** properties under assumption A .

Let $Mon(A)$ be the **monitorable** properties under A .

Theorem (cf. FalconeFernandezMounier12, BauerLeuckerSchallhart11):

1. $Obl(A) \subseteq Mon(A)$.
2. $Mon(A)$ is closed under boolean operations.

Cantor Topology on Σ^ω

Cantor metric on behaviors in Σ^ω :

$$d(w, w') = 1/2^n \text{ where } n \text{ is the length of the longest common prefix of } w \text{ and } w'$$

Topological operations on properties (and assumptions), i.e., subsets of Σ^ω :

- closure = smallest closed superset
- interior = largest open subset
- boundary = set difference between closure and interior

AlpernSchneider85, DiekertLeucker14:

- safe = closed
- co-safe = open
- live = dense
- monitorable = boundary has empty interior

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Topological Construction of Assumptions

Theorem (cf. H92): For every property P , there are unique weakest liveness assumptions A and B such that P is safe under A and co-safe under B .

Proof:

$$A = co(closure(P) \setminus P)$$

$$B = co(P \setminus interior(P))$$

Theorem: For every property P , there is a co-safety assumption C such that $P \in Mon(C)$.

$$boundary(P) = (closure(P) \setminus P) \cup (P \setminus interior(P))$$


$$C = co(closure(interior(boundary(P))))$$

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Topological Construction of Assumptions

Observations	$\Sigma = \{a, b, c, o\}$
Assumption A	$(\neg b)Ua$
Property P	$(\Box(a \rightarrow \Diamond b) \vee (\neg b)Ua) \wedge \Diamond c$

P is **live** (consider the extension $c\ b\ b\ b\ b\ b\ b\ \dots$).

P is **not monitorable** (consider the finite behavior b).

P is **monitorable under assumption A** (consider the continuation c).

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Open Question

What is the structure of the assumptions that make a given property monitorable?

Note: all presented results hold equally for


1. arbitrary properties and assumptions
2. ω -regular properties and assumptions
3. LTL properties and assumptions

Safety Monitoring with Registers *or* Assumptions can Save Resources

with Thomas Ferrère and Tom Henzinger
A Theory of Register Monitors
LICS 2018

Counter Safety Monitor

Counters: $(+1, =)$ (equivalently, $(+1, -1, = 0)$)



$$\{w \in \Sigma^\omega : \forall \pi < w : \#(a, \pi) \geq \#(b, \pi)\}$$

Expressiveness of Register Monitors

$$\Sigma_k = \{0, \dots, k\}$$

$$P_k = \{w \in \Sigma_k^\omega : \forall \pi \prec w : \forall i < k : \#(i+1, \pi) \geq \#(i, \pi)\}$$

Theorem:

1. For all k , the property P_k can be real-time monitored with $k + 1$ counters but not with k counters.
2. Any number of counters can be simulated in real time by four registers with $(+, -, \geq)$.

Open:

Does the hierarchy collapse for safety monitors with addition?
How about safety monitors with multiplication?

Counter Assumptions

$$P_k = P_i \cap A_{i,k} \text{ for } i \leq k$$

$$A_{i,k} = \{w \in \Sigma_k^\omega : \forall \pi < w : \forall i \leq j < k : \#(j+1, \pi) \geq \#(j, \pi)\}$$

Theorem:

For all k , the property P_k can be real-time monitored with i counters under assumption $A_{i,k}$ (which can be monitored with $k - i$ counters).

Summary

1. Assumptions can make properties monitorable and save monitor resources.
2. The expressiveness of online counter monitors increases with the number of registers.

Thank you!